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Introduction
In the wake of the declining faith in positivistic sociological theory, scholars have taken 
an interest in alternatives. Notable among these alternatives is sociological pragmatism. 
Indeed, scholars have increasingly utilized pragmatic theory in discussions regarding 
social mechanisms (Gross, 2009), social movements and the emotions associated with 
them (Barbarena et al., 2014; Emirbayer and Goldberg, 2005; Gahr and Young, 2014), 
culture (Alexander, 2004), theories of action (Joas, 1996), and belief (Strand and Lizardo, 
2015), among other topics. We welcome this shift in sociological discourse and look 
forward to further developments in this approach.
However, a major contribution to pragmatic theory seems conspicuously absent. 
Generally speaking, American pragmatists have neglected the French contribution to 
pragmatism’s broader development, despite previous attempts to popularize the para-
digm (Eulriet, 2008). This is curious since French pragmatic sociology’s landmark 
book, On Justification (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006 [1991]), has been discussed 
extensively in European journals, such as the European Journal of Social Theory 
(Benatouïl, 1999; Blok, 2013; Blokker, 2011; Boltanski and Thévenot, 1999; 
Guggenheim and Potthast, 2011; Jagd, 2011; Paulsen Hansen, 2014; Silber, 2003). 
This is not to say that American scholars have not engaged with the theory at all. 
However, the English literatures’ engagement has largely been limited to the fields of 
culture (Heinich, 2012; Lamont and Thévenot, 2000), economics (Biggart and 
Beamish, 2003; Stark, 2009), and organizations (Denis et al., 2007; Messner et al., 
2008, Patriotta et al., 2011).
Scholars have recently debated whether the French sociological framework is indeed 
pragmatic in the American sense. We believe that this is because, in part, French prag-
matic sociology’s intellectual architecture is not made explicitly clear. We are sympa-
thetic with authors like Louis Quéré and Cédric Terzi (2014), especially in regard to 
Boltanski’s neglect of theories of practice in his late pragmatic approach, exemplified by 
On Critique. However, as we will illustrate, we ultimately agree with Tanja Bogusz 
(2014) in that the general French pragmatic framework, at least in the Boltanskian vein, 
is rooted in a general pragmatist approach.
Our belief in the unity of the two approaches is rooted in a social-psychological 
reading of the two paradigms. Quéré and Terzi (2014: 98) focus on Dewey’s theory of 
practice, which is admittedly difficult to integrate with the French pragmatic theory 
of justification. Doing so neglects other American pragmatists, such as George 
Herbert Mead, whose pragmatism is more social-psychological in nature. We show 
how the French school synthesizes key elements of this American pragmatic tradition 
with phenomenology, which has existed in parallel but has remained at the margins of 
the discipline (Collins, 1994: 269–272; Lewis, 1976). French pragmatic sociology is 
an inheritor of both of these traditions, successfully uniting philosophical reflections 
on the self–other relationship and the analysis of socio-cultural contexts, something 
that both phenomenology and American pragmatism struggled to do. This synthesis 
provides a model for addressing two consistent shortcomings of American pragma-
tism and phenomenology: a reliance on micro-sociology that inadequately addresses 
the roles of institutions and the inability to effectively address conflict resolution 
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regarding different understandings of how the world should operate (Athens, 2002, 
2007; Boltanski, 2009; Hunt, 1991).[AQ: 1]
The general argument of this article is that French pragmatic sociology allows schol-
ars to synthesize two concepts that emphasize an agentic approach to studying social life 
from classical sociological theory, helping bring these concepts back to the forefront of 
contemporary sociological discussion. First is Mead’s concept of the Generalized Other 
(hereafter referred to as GO), which shows how one can take the point of view of the 
other within a culturally coherent common social group. The second is Schütz and 
Scheler’s framework of how the self can perceive the world through the same kind of 
intentional glance as others through common cultural beliefs (Etzrodt, 2008). This syn-
thesis helps us understand how individual actors consciously use collective thoughts 
shared by their communities to communicate, debate, and negotiate about how to under-
stand social contexts.
This article is divided into four sections. The first half outlines the past develop-
ments of pragmatism and sociological phenomenology in detail because we develop 
the social-psychological and phenomenological dimensions of French pragmatism. 
This somewhat unorthodox approach necessitates a clear illustration and justification 
of this way of understanding the paradigm. We first outline the general development 
of the American philosophical pragmatic tradition by focusing on one of its founders: 
George Herbert Mead. We then outline how Alfred Schütz and Max Scheler sociolo-
gized phenomenology, providing insights that American pragmatism left inadequately 
addressed. The final half of the article highlights how the French pragmatic tradition 
fits within this development of classical theory, as well as how it helps this broader 
micro-sociological paradigm move beyond its limitations. We illustrate how the 
French critique of strong positivism and desire to focus on how people understand the 
world, undivorced from their lived experience, are foundational parallels with 
American pragmatism and phenomenological sociology. We then illustrate how 
French pragmatic sociology, in reversing the traditional French focus on institutions’ 
and culture’s unconscious influence on individuals, better highlights the interplay 
between interactions/institutions and better incorporates the regularity/normality of 
conflicting understandings in everyday life than classical pragmatism and sociologi-
cal phenomenology.
American pragmatism and the other
American philosophical pragmatism has a long, rich tradition, one which requires sepa-
rate books and manuscripts to discuss in depth. While Bogusz, Terzi, and Quéré focus on 
William James and John Dewey to engage with Boltanski’s approach, we focus on 
George Herbert Mead. Mead’s theories on social psychology and the development of the 
social self have had a remarkable impact on the sociological discourse, particularly 
through his influence on symbolic interactionism and pragmatic theories of action 
(Blumer, 1969; Côté, 2016; Joas, 1996; Schubert, 2006). As such, we must include his 
perspective if we are to decide whether French sociological pragmatism is part of the 
broader pragmatic corpus derived from the American tradition.
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Mead’s process of self-development, and the way it changes thinking, was the 
foundation for his broader theory of social action. Mead argues that the self develops 
in two distinct stages. First, one develops his or her own views and interests, incorpo-
rating others’ perspectives only to the extent that the other is necessary for the self’s 
goals. Second is the accommodation of one’s own views and interests with those of 
the GO. This is not simply taking into account broader society’s views as distinct 
from one’s own: one’s self is not complete until he or she has incorporated other’s 
views into his or her own. This social integration is possible due to the feeling of 
sympathy that spontaneously emerges from an individual once he or she understands 
how others see himself or herself. It is at this very moment that an “individual experi-
ences himself as such, not directly, but only indirectly, from the generalized stand-
point of the social group as a whole to which he belongs,” that is, the GO (Mead, 
1934: 138). One cannot be a fully functioning member of society until he or she 
understands the values and intents of the general populace and incorporates those 
views into one’s own (Mead, 1934: 152–164).
Mead’s focus on social psychology and understanding social cognition heavily 
influenced his understanding of broader social structures and how groups of actors 
work as a collectivity. He understood social institutions as the common response by 
all community members to a particular situation. These institutions shaped social 
action, but did not dictate it: bound only by common symbols used for communica-
tion, individuals are free to creatively act, as long as they can effectively communi-
cate and navigate the social world. If people are fully integrated within the social 
world, they are able to understand the thoughts of the GO and adjust their actions 
accordingly, creating a harmonious society (Athens, 2007: 28–30; Mead, 1934: 260–
267, 321–326).
Two examples illustrate how the self-GO relationship maintains larger social institu-
tions. First, economic exchange depends on one’s ability to
identify yourself not simply in the particular matter of exchange, but find out what he [the 
other] wants and why he wants it, what will be the conditions of payment, the particular 
character of the goods desired, and so on. You have to identify yourself with him more and 
more.
(Mead, 1934: 298)
Without this ability to understand the GO, the broader economy would collapse as trade 
would not be possible. Second, Mead extends this conceptualization of this relationship 
between the self and the GO toward culture, particularly democratic culture. Democracy 
is an ideal representation of a political institution representing the self-GO relationship: 
“[…] democracy […] is an attitude which depends upon the type of self which goes with 
the universal relations of brotherhood, however that be reached” (Mead, 1934: 286). 
Within a functioning democracy, individuals are free to develop themselves and exhibit 
autonomy. However, this autonomy is not wholly free of others. An individual has a 
common general understanding of how his or her fellow citizens understand the world, 
what they value, and so on. In other words, subscribers to democratic culture have a 
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broad understanding of the GO and keep this in mind in their daily and political actions 
(Mead, 1934: 286–289).
Ideally, no conflict would occur due to regular communication among individuals:
The ideal of human society is one which does bring people so closely together in their 
interrelationships, so fully develops the necessary system of communication, that the individuals 
who exercise their now peculiar functions can take the attitude of those whom they affect.
(Mead, 1934: 327)
However, people cannot always effectively communicate or navigate the social world. 
Mead believed that ethical problems arise when individuals encounter situations where 
they cannot easily adapt or adjust their thoughts or actions. In these situations, hostility 
or self-superiority comes to the forefront of the individuals’ minds, making integration 
difficult. Because the self comes at the expense of the community in this situation, con-
flict ensues, and it can only be resolved when the self is reintegrated into the community, 
that is, when it shares a common understanding with the GO (Mead, 1934: 319–321). 
This dysfunctional approach to conflict also applies when groups distinguish themselves 
from a broader community of groups, allowing anti-social feelings to arise from a sense 
of self-preservation. This can be alleviated by reunifying these groups, a process that 
includes practices such as reconstructing the GO to include a wider variety of views or 
by uniting disparate groups against a common threat (Mead, 1934: 303–311).
This understanding of conflict highlights Mead’s general assumption of unified cul-
tural understandings. Within his broader model, larger institutions are constructed 
based on roles and the expectations that come alongside those roles. However, as 
Charles Horton Cooley noted, many values that we hold are inherited with the institu-
tions we receive (Schubert, 2006). However, if many people have fundamentally dif-
ferent understandings of the purpose of institutions, then how can we effectively 
reconstruct the GO? Mead’s theory is limited by his general social-psychological 
approach, which often extrapolates the experiences of the individual to the collective; 
it is unable to account for the utilization of cultural constructs outside of those created 
for specific and explicit purposes. It is also limited by considering conflict as patho-
logical in a normal, peaceful social situation. Conflict is not considered as a common 
way of building interactions in social life, but as a disease that momentarily excludes 
an individual from the coherent GO.
John Dewey takes an improved approach to conflict. Much like Mead, Dewey argues 
that self-reintegration is best completed through a continual process of communication. 
Unlike Mead, Dewey did not treat conflict as a residual category that would only arise 
when the self becomes estranged from the GO. He understood that communities would 
generally be composed of a great number of individuals, all of whom would have their 
own ideas of how to act and what values were important. To integrate these into a Great 
Community, there had to be a regular dialogue between them all (Dewey, 1981: 620–
643). However, as Cornel West (1989: 101–106) notes, this view was quite optimistic, 
relying on an argument that largely only works within homogeneous communities lack-
ing major divisions. Divisions may be omnipresent, but small ones do not threaten group 
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cohesiveness. Significant, intractable divisions, based on fundamentally different out-
looks, values, and understandings, make it more difficult to create a singular community 
outlook. In many ways, this argument foreshadows the main focus of French pragmatic 
sociology: how communities use communicative action to create shared understandings 
to justify action. However, Dewey’s comments are still rooted in the fundamental 
assumption that conflict within communicative action is not consubstantial to social life, 
but an ever-present social ill to be continually remedied.
Generally speaking, the fact that pragmatism considers community as something that 
must be basically defined by its homogeneity and unity continues to influence more 
contemporary authors. The pragmatist theory of action and how it incorporates social 
structures were further developed within the broader symbolic interactionist tradition 
(Blumer, 1969; Lewis, 1976; Schubert, 2006). Herbert Blumer emphasized a key aspect 
of Mead’s theory, one that would go on to be critically inspirational for contemporary 
pragmatic scholars such as Hans Joas (1996, 1997: 13–14; see also Habermas’ (1984, 
1987) concept of communicative rationality). Collective action and social structures are 
the result of individuals aligning their actions through their imaginations of how others 
would act and responding accordingly (Blumer, 1969: 78–89). People’s actions are not 
strictly determined by social structures: social structures are a result of individuals using 
their agency to coordinate their actions. They purposefully act in concert, guided by 
shared aims, thereby reducing conflict; actions are not prescribed by outside forces.
Although he doesn’t explicitly use a pragmatic model derived from the American 
tradition, Jeffrey Alexander’s (2004) discussion of the role of ritual illustrates the contin-
ued reliance on unity with the GO as a driving force in pragmatic theory. Ritual helps 
unify individuals with a GO through performance, drawing on commonly held cultural 
understandings beyond language to help illustrate the authenticity of individuals’ com-
munications; disjuncture with this GO disrupts communication and understanding. More 
recently, Holdsworth and Morgan’s (2007) re-exploration of the Meadian GO illustrates 
the continued debate about the way the concept is used when exploring conflict and judg-
ment. They note that while who is part of the GO shifts, people regularly seem to refer to 
one single GO in speech, and one’s distance from this singular collective understanding 
is used to make judgments about the self or others. Once again, we can see that the prag-
matic model generally emphasizes a sort of unity with the GO as a central theme in 
understanding conflict; discrepancy is disruptive, or perhaps frowned upon.
Mead’s oeuvre left much to be desired in regard to social conflict as a whole, leaving 
the problems of domination, power, deception, and manipulation largely undiscussed 
(Athens, 2002; Hunt, 1991). This prompted Lonnie Athens (2007) to propose a counter-
part to Meadian symbolic interactionism: radical interactionism. Whereas Mead empha-
sizes sociability as the foundation for society, Athens builds a symbolic interactionist 
model where domination takes center place. He highlights how Mead neglected the role 
that hierarchy and power play in coordinating people’s understandings – often, uncon-
sciously, producing an idealized, egalitarian, but incorrect, understanding of the social 
world. His model is a welcome addition, but maintains the assumption of the need for a 
unified understanding of the social world. As we will see later, French pragmatists agree 
that hierarchy and power play pivotal roles in the social world, but differ in the require-
ment for unity in understandings for a functioning social world. They see conflict as 
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inherent in the social world, not a pathological problem that must perpetually be amelio-
rated. What happens when they do not see the world as the GO, perhaps not even wanting 
to act in concert?
Phenomenology and the question of the other
While sociology incorporated Mead’s theories into their corpus, he never offered con-
crete ways to observe the social-psychological mechanics of his theory in action. He 
does not explain how a person actively shares meanings, thoughts, or general under-
standings of the world with the GO (Etzrodt, 2008: 170–171; Schütz, 1962a: 18–19). 
How can one understand that he or she has the same perception as the GO? Mead’s bril-
liance is limited by his behaviorism, relying on outside observation. Identical behaviors 
can have very different significations to scientists and their subjects (Schütz, 1962b: 
209–210). Phenomenology partially solves pragmatism’s problem of how to understand 
the influence of the GO on the mind of the self.
Schütz turns to Husserl to help him penetrate the relationship between the individual 
and his consciousness that Mead left unaddressed. He focuses on the phenomenological 
concept of intentionality, that is, the various peculiar fashions through which the self 
perceives the world. Husserl (1977 [1949]) uses intentionality aimed at a house to illus-
trate this concept:
The house-perception means a house – more precisely, as this individual – and means it in the 
fashion peculiar to perception; a house-memory, in the fashion peculiar to memory; a house-
phantasy in the fashion peculiar to phantasy. A predicative judging about a house, which 
perhaps is “there” perceptually, means it in just the fashion peculiar to judging; a / valuing that 
supervenes means it in yet another fashion; and so forth. Conscious processes are also called 
intentional; but then the word intentionality signifies nothing else than this universal 
fundamental property of consciousness: to be consciousness of something; as a cogito, to be 
bear within itself its cogitatum.
(p. 33)
Because consciousness always apprehends objects of the world according to a spe-
cific, peculiar fashion (perception, phantasy, memory, imagination, etc.), conscious-
ness constitutes the unity of objects in the living world. Consciousness can be supported 
by different intentional states of mind (peculiar fashions), but it is the only center of 
the subject.
The non-social, solipsistic starting point of this theory is one reason why scholars 
dismiss Husserl’s relevance to sociology. Objects of the world are only thinkable since 
they appear constituted in (and presented to) self-consciousness. The constitution of the 
meaning of objects is here attributed to the self who “must be fixed as the only possible 
center of the world” (Marion, 1991: 191; our translation). It is an approach that is “first 
of all monadic, and then intermonadic” (Husserl, (1994 [1949]: 156). Aware of Husserlian 
solipsistic subjectivism, Schütz remained convinced that Husserl’s description of how 
consciousness gives sense and meanings to the world complemented Mead’s behavior-
ism. One needed only to make this relationship between observation and consciousness 
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something eminently social, but not strictly deterministic. Schütz (1962c) achieves this 
by focusing on culture:
Our everyday world is, from the outset, an intersubjective world of culture. It is intersubjective 
because we live in it as men among other men, bound to them through common influence and 
work, understanding others and being an object of understanding for others.
(p. 133)
The naïvely living person
Automatically has in hand, so to speak, the meaningful complexes which are valid for him. 
From things, inherited and learned, from the manifold sedimentations of tradition, habituality, 
and his own previous constitutions of meaning, which can be retained and reactivated, his 
store of experience of his life-world is built up as a closed meaningful complex […]. One can 
always reactivate the process which has built up the sediments of meaning, and one can 
explain the intentionalities of the perspectives of relevance and the horizons of interest […]. 
To accomplish this on the level of mundane intersubjectivity is the task of the mundane 
cultural sciences.[AQ: 2]
(1962c: 136)
I understand others and can identify with them through a common background of 
culturally built significations used to perceive the world with the same peculiar fashion 
of consciousness, the same states of mind. I give meaning to my experiences through 
these shared meanings. Key here is that meanings are not subjectively constituted through 
individual peculiar fashions: some have been intersubjectively constituted before me. 
Traditions, habits, and other sedimentations of past meanings give specific colors to my 
perceptions. These shared understandings facilitate sharing my perceptions with others 
by minimizing debates over meaning. For example, I can remember my childhood house 
with the same emotion as a friend who remembers his own because we share the same 
representation of “my childhood house” in a society where the nuclear family is valid 
and historically dominant.
Like Mead, Schütz (1962c) explains that one’s understanding of the social world is 
based on understandings of others’ interpretations:
I posit meaningful acts in the expectation that Others will interpret them meaningfully, and my 
schema of positing is oriented with respect to the others’ schema of interpretation. […]Thus on 
these reciprocal acts of positing meaning and of interpretation of meaning, my social world of 
mundane intersubjectivity is built; it is also the social world of Others, and all other social and 
cultural phenomena are founded upon it.
(p. 135)
To understand these acts, their intersubjective meanings, and the way we perceive 
them is the work of social science.
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Schütz’s phenomenology fails to develop into a real phenomenological sociology. 
Like Husserl, he always returns to the subject. He describes the way one gives meaning 
to cultural sedimentations and habits, but never the translation between the world of 
culture and the self. He contents himself with repeating Husserl’s subjective examples. 
The individual he talks about is one that “perceives, sees, smells, etc.,” any kind of inten-
tional act of consciousness systematized into a grid for sociological reading, and any 
collective dimensions of what it could mean “to touch, to see or to smell” are studied. He 
talks about complex cultural meanings used by the subject to perceive, imagine, and 
judge, but largely leaves the collectivities undefined.
Max Scheler offers a solution to this problem by emphasizing the social notion of 
intentional states (peculiar fashions) of consciousness (or mind). Unlike Husserl and 
Schütz, Scheler focused on how one’s experiences are mediated by the Other, providing
philosophical answers to such fundamental sociological questions as the problem of 
intersubjectivity (how can I have access to the mind of others?), interaction (how can we 
coordinate our actions and intentionally act together?) and the constitution of society (how are 
our interactions mediated by and institutionalized into a common world.
(Vandenberghe, 2008: 18)
He does this through the sociological interpretation of intentionality (Scheler, 1980 [1926], 
1982 [1919]).1 Scheler shifts from Husserl’s and Schütz’s notion of subjective intentionality 
and individual state of mind to a collective disposition toward the world, such that “depend-
ing on the nature of a specific attitude of consciousness, things around us appear in a specific 
light” (Frings, 1997: 169). Intentional states of mind “appear as characteristics, respective 
forces of the environment: for they are supra-individual: a collective spirit and collective 
living of the present” (Scheler, 1982 [1919]: 623; our translation). These are not fixed cogni-
tive categories, but naturalizing states of mind contingent on changing historical realities:
A theophantic mind-set dominated the age of mythology according to which earthly things and 
events bespoke the divine. The celestial bodies, the seasons, animals, mountains and oceans 
appeared according to a mind-set that attributed their existence to divine. By contrast in our time 
it is difficult for a capitalist to imagine, for example, the fury of Zeus manifested in a thunderbolt 
[…]. In the capitalist mind-set, things and entities of the world are experienced under aspects of 
profitability, capitalization and usefulness that pervade our technological civilization.
(Frings, 1997: 173)
We no longer rely on individualistic categories to describe our relations to the world, 
but something social and cultural, for example, the capitalist state of mind. The change 
is radical in phenomenology. Rather than a material order, Scheler understands “this 
mysterious specter of the so-called capital” as the way of seeing the world which lets all 
objects come to be understood in terms of the social values related to appropriation: “I 
claim that the ‘commodity’ is everything […] that is recognized, seen, interpreted through 
this mode of valuing and impulsive structure like through a particular lens” (Scheler, 
1982 [1919]: 619; our translation).
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Scheler tries to show that capitalism is not only an economic exchange model useful 
to create a communicative interaction, as Mead intimated. Instead, economic exchange 
was a modern way of apprehending all the objects of the world, seeing things as profit 
sources. For the capitalist state of mind, everything is potentially a source of capitaliza-
tion: commodities, atoms, a human voice, Eros, art. “Things themselves are looking at 
man regarding their ability of capitalisation. They ask him the same claim: ‘see the profit 
that you can take over me’” (Frings, 1988: 356). Modern man became homo capitalisti-
cus, declining each kind of intentional perspective of his conscious with the peculiar 
fashion of profit and utility (Scheler, 1982 [1919]: 632). His or her state of mind presents 
the world as a market where things can either be appropriated or do not exist. This view 
disregards whether things should be seen with other social intentional peculiar fashions, 
for example, real emotion from nineteenth-century art or passionless faith from religious 
objects. We can say that the states of mind in action and justification are specific attitudes 
(acts) of consciousness in the life-world.
This innovation helps solidify the link between phenomenology and pragmatism, par-
ticularly that of Mead. According to Mead (1934),
The individual experiences himself as such, not directly, but only indirectly, from the particular 
standpoints of other individual members of the same social group, or from the generalized 
standpoint of the social group as a whole to which he belongs.
(p. 138)
Boltanski and Thévenot (2006 [1991]: 60–61) utilize this passage to highlight how this 
understanding of the GO, like a collective phenomenological approach, relies on the 
interaction between monadic individuals, other social actors, and, most importantly, 
meaning systems constructed to mediate between them. Collective or cultural meanings 
shape intentional states of mind and help the self integrate with the GO. For the first time, 
culture and society have a real place within both phenomenology and pragmatism.
Like Schütz and American pragmatists such as Mead, Scheler does not provide any 
empirical or concrete description of collective states of mind, except the very general 
category of “capitalism” or “Greek mythos.” Moreover he never explains whether con-
flict over meanings derived from collective states of mind can arise between people with 
different perceptions or significations. We live in a peaceful social world, historically 
built by agreed-upon habits and traditions. In order to practice sociology, however, one 
must, at one moment or another, refer to a typology that enables comprehensive discus-
sions regarding individuals’ understandings that converge or diverge, depending on 
whether or not they have the “same natural attitude of consciousness.” We believe that 
French pragmatic sociology offers one way to think about this topic.
Pragmatic sociology: A French declination of pragmatism and 
phenomenology
French pragmatic sociology has many different labels: sociology of disputes, justifica-
tion theory, sociology of ordinary critique (Thévenot, 2014, 2016). Its naissance was 
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rooted in part due to a desire to construct a critical sociology that challenged the hegem-
onic Bourdieuian structuralism in 1980s French sociology (Benatouïl, 1999, Boltanski, 
2011 [2009], Frère, 2004). It has continuously grown in popularity in sociological labo-
ratories in the Francophone academic field, in part due to the success of On Justification 
(Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006 [1991]). Despite this success, French pragmatic sociol-
ogy only attracted heightened interest within the Anglophone academy following the 
translation and Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2007) The New Spirit of Capitalism.
Boltanski (2011 [2009], 2012) recognizes that his sociology has borrowed heavily 
from American pragmatism, ethnomethodology, and phenomenology (pp. 24–25, pp. 
340–341). Echoing American pragmatists and Schütz, he and Thévenot critique social 
sciences’ disregard for common sense, equating positivistic science with truth. They 
argue that “in every day life, […] like scientists, ordinary people never stop suspecting, 
wondering, and submitting the world to tests” (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006 [1991]: 
54). There exist some situations where “actors exhibit their action and unfold it verbally. 
On such occasions, they seek to generalize and to constitute facts by means of language, 
and as they do so they use language in a way that approaches that of sciences” (Boltanski 
and Thévenot, 2006 [1991]: 356).[AQ: 3]
This is why justifications from the common sense of ordinary people must be taken 
seriously by sociologists. They translate states of mind that act like scientific inquiries. 
This has significant implications for how social scientists approach their subjects of 
study, as they no longer monopolize the legitimizing theory producing/testing mind-set. 
As Boltanski (2012 [1990]) explains,
To begin, we have to give up the idea that we can have the last word by producing – and 
imposing on actors – more powerful reports than the ones they themselves are able to produce; 
in other words, we have to abandon the way classical sociology has conceptualized the 
asymmetry between researchers and actors […]. Instead of defining agents by means of stables 
attributes (i.e. habitus, predispositions, etc.), endowing them with interests and tendencies that 
are inscribed in the body and capable of generating objective unconscious intentions, and then 
assigning itself the task of explaining the actions of these agents when they encounter external 
obstacles, (our) sociology shows how actors develop discourses about these actions, how they 
shape their action into a plot.
(pp. 28–30)
This emphasis on the agency and intentionality is partially why Bogusz (2014: 130, 
146) argues that the Boltanskian and Thévenotian model fits within the American prag-
matic framework.
The double space usually opposing the “deep reality of the sociologist” and the “illu-
sion of common sense” is not valid in pragmatic sociology in general and in its meta-
physics of the polity, which we describe below, in particular:
I take the actors’ arguments as they come, without subjecting them to my own critique; I simply 
confront them with models (the polities) that are themselves the product of an effort to describe 
the common competence explicitly and systematically. […] Renouncing any claim to an 
analytical capacity that would be radically different from the actor’s, on the basis of which we 
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could explain the actor’s behavior in his place and better than he could do it himself, we are 
making the sacrifice of our understanding […]. When we give up the possibility of presenting 
our own version and of having the last word, we reject engaging in an activity that the actor 
does not have to renounce.
(Boltanski 2012 [1990]: 35)
The influences of micro-interactionism within American pragmatism and phenome-
nology become apparent here. Schütz saw common sense as a kind of cultural back-
ground that provides concepts and significations to individuals in the life-world. He does 
not idealize behavioristic science: “thought objects constructed by the social scientist, in 
order to grasp this social reality, have to be founded upon the thought objects constructed 
by the common-sense thinking of men, living their daily life within their social world” 
(Schütz, 1962d: 59). This is why Schütz refers to their conceptual constructions as “sec-
ond-degree constructions.” He shows how sociologists could benefit from paying more 
attention to everyday life. Any knowledge of the world, “in common-sense thinking as 
well as in science, involves mental construct syntheses, generalizations, formalizations, 
idealizations specific to the respective level of thought organization” (Schütz, 1962d: 
58). But common sense precedes science. The thing – as it is perceived in the “natural 
attitude” which we adopt in the life-world – precedes scientific conceptualization.
The pragmatist conception of science echoes this sentiment. For example, William 
James (1978 [1907]) argued that hypotheses originating from common sense do not hold 
a lesser value of truth than their scientific equivalents:
Our fundamental ways of thinking about things are discoveries of exceedingly remote ancestors, 
which have been able to preserve themselves throughout the experience of all subsequent time. 
They form one great stage of equilibrium in the human mind’s development, the stage of 
common sense. Other stages grafted themselves upon this stage, but have never succeeded in 
displacing it.
(pp. 83–84)
Common sense refers to the fact that an individual is likely to use certain intellectual 
forms or categories of thought and that these can be extremely useful in daily life. 
Common sense organizes the life-world through a series of concepts that originate from 
experience and that combine and order themselves according to each situation. 
Everywhere in practical life, “the common-sense denkmittel are uniformly victorious” 
(James, 1978 [1907]: 88).
In both traditions, there are no pure facts: facts are selected and interpreted according 
to some relevant aspects for us, reflecting a particular mind-set or intentionality. Schütz 
(1962a: 5) explains that James’ statements resonate with Deweyian pragmatism: “our 
whole knowledge of the world, in common-sense as well as in scientific thinking, 
involves constructs, i.e., a set of abstractions, generalizations, formalizations, idealiza-
tions specific to the respective level of thought organization.” This thought can be located 
on the level of science or on the level of the states of mind we encounter in daily life, 
when we argue about how the lived situation must be understood.
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Paralleling James, Dewey, and Schütz’s suggestions to abstract intellectual forms of 
thought used by people every day, French pragmatists encourage us to clarify the states 
of mind that people utilize when they act and justify their actions. In the immediate 
moment, people often only superficially consider the moral values that they use to justify 
the whats and whys of action (Boltanski, 2012 [1990]: 31). French pragmatic sociolo-
gists emphasize the possibility of studying action through people’s mental schemata, 
their cognitive mind-sets, in the dynamics of their perception to things:
The way in which this sociology breaks down the action thus attempts to parallel what is 
observed in acting individuals in a situation. […] What is aimed at is not what the world is 
“objectively” (or scientifically) but the world as it is perceived through the ordinary sense [the 
intentional peculiar fashions of consciousness], the way the world is seen by the acting 
individuals in a situation during a course of action and how people in a situation conform to that 
world or question it.
(Corcuff, 2001: 109–110; authors’ translation)
The sociologist must climb the argumentative chain until he or she finds statements with 
a degree of generalization acceptable to the actors. These categories, labeled as common 
goods because of their social origin, are necessary to understand what is at stake in a 
social interaction.
In our phenomenological reading, common goods can be understood as values repre-
senting states of mind shared by people, peculiar fashions of consciousness, GOs, or 
moral communities. These moral communities are culturally and historically built, 
embedded within common sense, providing a framework through which individuals can 
evaluate their life-world. Boltanski and Thévenot (2006 [1991]) allow us to go beyond 
Schütz’s stunted analysis. There are six notable moral communities, called polities, 
which can describe people’s states of mind: merchant, domestic, industrial, civic, 
inspired, and opinion. Boltanski and Thévenot derived their polities from occidental 
political philosophies. We are no longer dealing with simple subjective intentional rela-
tionships of perception, imagination, value judgments, and so on, but with general cul-
tural registers, mind-sets, and ways to be in the world, similar to Scheler’s capitalist state 
of mind. Through seminal texts, philosophers modeled general registers of justifications 
that represent dominant schemas, systematized states of mind which are utilized to gen-
erate justifications derived from common goods. Each polity slowly transformed into a 
common sense usable without reference to their original sources. Thus, a cultural history 
of Western Europe illustrates that a slow process of institutionalization incorporated 
these intentional mind-sets, available for use in argumentation, in socializing structures 
like social organizations. These different mind-sets, different GOs, form the foundation 
of our everyday life debates and conflicts. These mind-sets, represented by polities, are 
summarized in Table 1.
To help understand this table, we’ll briefly break down the first polity concept listed: 
the civic polity. This concept is illustrated by Rousseau’s argument about the general 
interest in The Social Contract. This is a polity in which people self-represent and justify 
their actions by arguing to a GO perspective derived from whether their point of view 
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benefits the common good of the general interest; worthiness is speaking in the name of 
the collectivity. One thus justifies one’s intentions by arguing that one has received a 
mandate, been elected, sworn by oath, and so on – in short, that the collectivity has 
granted one the right to speak in its name for the common good, not only for oneself.
A polity is thus a sort of justification kit that individuals consciously mobilize – a 
mind-set from which one can draw arguments (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006 [1991]: 
69). When individuals argue in a specific polity, they intentionally direct their arguments 
toward the common good inherent to the polity they chose, giving a specific meaning to 
reality. As David Stark (2009) noted, polities are about what counts in understanding 
reality:
Each of us confronts this question on daily basis. Faced with decisions involving 
incommensurable frameworks – work versus family life, career opportunities versus loyalty to 
friends or attachment to a locality, vacations versus investments for retirement, and so on – we 
ask ourselves what really counts. What is valuable, and by what measures?
(p. 6)
We continuously appeal to different common goods based on the specific contexts of our 
daily lives.
Although the notion of common goods insists on explanatory elements that resemble 
social structures, it should not be understood as external structures that become internal-
ized as social norms. A state of mind is neither externally guaranteed nor stabilized 
through unconscious naturalization (cf. Bourdieu, 1984 [1979]). It is a sense-making 
device, rendering a situation intelligible and meaningful to the common sense through 
organizing facts according to the moral communities, the GOs, one belongs to. The com-
mon good is the general intentional state of mind through which an actor sees the world. 
Table 1. Boltanski and Thévenot’s six polities of justification.
Polities/mind-sets/states 






Representative philosophical work 
of ideal polity
Civic general interest, 
citizenship
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s The Social 
Contract
Industrial Productivity; efficiency Henri de Saint-Simon’s L’Industrie
Domestic Care; familial 
relationships
Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet’s Politics 
Drawn from the Very Words of Holy 
Scriptures
Opinion Fame; popularity Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan
Inspired Anti-materialism; 
creativity
Saint Augustine’s The City of God
Merchant Interest; greed Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations
GO: Generalized Other.
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Justifications do not rationalize reality, but are constitutive of reality (Fligstein, 2006). 
How cultural dispositions and common goods are articulated is at the heart of a represen-
tation of the world. They are mobilized consciously by people in a rational way even if 
they don’t use the technical vocabulary of the scientist, paralleling American pragmatist 
and phenomenological paradigms.
By allowing one to make the object of inquiry intentionally conscious, French prag-
matic sociology emphasizes actors’ capacities to recognize and reflect upon the multiple 
values or common goods that co-exist with and co-construct social reality. The justifica-
tion framework highlights the role of values (common goods) in the sociological study 
of action. Justification is the way of speaking influenced by these constructions inherited 
from some philosophical frameworks, embodied within their culture, which lie at the 
heart of how people make judgments about the world and/or what they are doing. This is 
why French pragmatic sociology has attracted attention as a “micro-sociology with a 
macro-cultural thrust” (Silber, 2003: 428). It has the heuristic power to illuminate the 
meaning given by an individual to a situation retaining the importance of the broader 
cultural context.
Individuals use their rationality and understanding of different mind-sets and situa-
tional contexts to justify their actions to others:
We are in position to understand the actions of persons when […] we have grasped the 
constraints that they have had to take into account, in the situation in which they found 
themselves, in order to make their critiques or their judgments acceptable for others.
(Boltanski, 2012 [1990]: 33)
Actors attempt to convince others that their actions are justifiable vis-à-vis the state of 
mind in which they act, in turn based on a specific understanding of common a GO or 
mind-set. Social life includes opposition, exchange, or disputes between people who try 
to convince others that the situation must be perceived through his or her intentional state 
of mind (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006 [1991]: 74–80).
Two abstract examples illustrate how actors utilize multiple GOs (polities/fashions of 
consciousness) to navigate everyday disputes. First, disputes can take place within a 
single polity: individuals disagree on who best represents the same GO. Consider, for 
example, the case of an employee about to be fired for lack of productivity. The employee 
could appeal to an industrial GO, noting the critical importance of his or her experience. 
Both experience and productivity represent the same value within the industrial fashion 
of consciousness: efficiency. To move beyond the conflict, the boss and employee must 
decide whose understanding of efficiency is most useful in this scenario. Second, indi-
viduals can disagree about which polity to appeal to in order to move beyond a dispute. 
Keeping our example in mind, the employee may appeal to another GO, for example, a 
domestic one, by asking what would become of his or her family if he or she were fired. 
Importantly, we must keep in mind that these disputes are not rational vis-à-vis rational 
choice theory: the employee’s argument derives from his experiences in the domestic 
state of mind and the emotions derived from them, not from a cold calculation created to 
win an argument.
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Individuals can switch to another normative argument when they realize they are 
likely to lose the dispute in a given polity whose argumentative logic plays against them. 
Importantly, in either scenario, the conflict does not have to be resolved peacefully: the 
boss can dismiss the appeals of the employee, resolving the dispute by flexing their 
power and rejecting any attempt to unify understandings. Conflict then is resolved not by 
negotiation and aligning the self with a newly agreed-upon GO, but by fiat.
Like Mead’s self-GO relationship, French pragmatists argue that we can (or not) share 
a common state of mind with others, giving the same collective meanings to objects and 
to events because we share (or not) the same understanding of the situation. Actions and 
justifications are coordinated according to the same common understanding. But while 
the concept of moral communities resembles Mead’s self–GO relationship and the defi-
nition of the phenomenological intentional collective mind-set, the role of conflict in 
French pragmatism differs. The declared aim of this approach is to build a sociological 
system able to represent conflict and disputes in social life, a struggle for classical 
American pragmatism and phenomenology. Indeed, the social world is not as peaceful as 
Mead or Schütz suppose.
New frontiers in sociological pragmatism: Interactions/
institutions and conflict
With the broader lineage between American pragmatism, phenomenology, and French 
pragmatism made explicit, the innovations introduced by French pragmatists are easier 
to see. Here we focus on two main contributions to this broader history: a clearer under-
standing of the relationship between interactions and institutions, the micro and the 
macro, and the normalization of conflict as a central factor within social life (Boltanski, 
2011 [2009]: chapter 3). While neither is unique in sociological analysis, more classical 
pragmatic approaches often had trouble reconciling the two. In their system, the 
Francophone pragmatists have offered a way forward, not only innovating in regard to 
pragmatic theory but also helping to bring this general approach into dialogue with other 
dominant sociological paradigms.
First is the interplay between interaction and institutions. As noted above, classical 
pragmatists like Mead assume that broader social institutions are largely derived from 
the extrapolation of the micro-interactive experience. For example, markets and democ-
racy are merely the manifestation of the broader self–GO relationship in different social 
spheres. As Ilana Silber (2003) notes, however, French pragmatism more closely resem-
bles variants of repertoire theory, where actors’ disputes are embedded within broader 
cultural understandings. People are not bound to negotiate between a singular GO 
understanding and the self. Instead, they use interactions as a starting point during a 
period of indeterminacy, which regularly occurs whenever there is a conflict in under-
standings. Actors acknowledge that there exist different GOs and, within their interac-
tions, can change them like lenses until they find a GO that helps them in moments 
where it becomes unclear how we should understand what is happening. In other words, 
institutions are not just derived from negotiations of individuals balancing the relatively 
stable self–GO relationship: the self–GO relationship is inherently unstable, and indi-
viduals constantly negotiate with one another and themselves about how to understand 
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a situation, using inherited cultural understandings that affect their ability to play with, 
and negotiate, meaning.
Importantly, these interactions illustrate that actors are not bound by these broader 
macro-forces and understandings, fitting with the pragmatic and phenomenological her-
itage. During interactions, actors modify and innovate within and beyond these macro-
cultural understandings to fit their complex lives. Individuals want to establish some 
permanence in this ever-changing experience, choosing what is valuable. The world is 
filled with beings who can ignore, reject, re-characterize, or integrate into the institu-
tional social order (Boltanski, 2011: 58). Institutional realities consist of various ele-
ments extracted from the life-world, instituted by actors via categorization, 
characterization, and totalization.
These modifications of the macro go on to influence later interactions, establishing a 
regular recursive dynamic whereby people regularly readjust their individual mind-sets 
and their various cultural understandings in the life-world, their GOs, based on what 
works in a given situation. Institutions derived from these processes, thus, do not repre-
sent a self–GO interaction, but are composed of multiple GOs, fluidly transposed and 
modified by selves in an effort to fit past understandings with present contexts or to use 
present contexts to change instituted meanings of instituted apparatus.
Agency is, thus, at the center of this approach, unlike structural accounts. French pragma-
tism walks the fine line between the micro-interactions of classical pragmatism and the more 
common structuralism associated with French sociologists such as Emile Durkheim and 
Pierre Bourdieu. French pragmatists focus on micro-interactions, but larger social structures, 
represented by polities, are never eliminated from the analysis. They draw attention to alter-
native desires and understandings, testing the sturdiness of social structures. What emerges 
here is a new paradigm, departing from consciousness reified by fields, social classes, or 
established order. The sociologist does not grant but helps actors realize their agency. Part of 
the study of interaction is examining how people play with broader understandings, modify-
ing them as they negotiate in the social world. It is this broader wellspring which people draw 
from in their everyday life. We must recognize people’s creative use of these resources, as 
they do not always use them in their prescribed manner. Thus, this approach not only helps 
illustrate the delicate balance between an emphasis on respondents’ specific contexts but also 
incorporates the broader cultural one in which people are embedded.
This brings us to perhaps French pragmatism’s strongest contribution to the evolution 
of the broader pragmatic framework: the regularity of conflict. When actors are not 
bound by a singular GO, indeed are even cognizant of these different fashions of con-
sciousness, it is no longer dysfunctional if their view differs from others. Each GO (or 
polity) offers a potential window into the mind of others, other modalities of thought – 
fashions of consciousness. Only by being flexible in their attempts to understand them-
selves and others can people work forward when conflict arises.
This paradigm actually goes further than the axiom that conflict and justification are 
not anomalies that need to be alleviated: they are in actuality the norm. Within the broader 
polity model proposed by Boltanski and Thévenot, there always exists a multitude of 
understandings, fashions of consciousness, and GOs in whom individuals are in constant 
dialogue with. As each polity is essentially a representation of one particular form of 
consciousness, with its own particular logic of justification, conflict is not seen as a break 
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with a GO or broader society that needs repair. Instead, we experience conflict every day, 
and only by regularly engaging with debate and finding areas of agreement, however 
temporary, is society maintained. This contrasts with a Meadian understanding, where 
agreement via the GO is the norm: here, GOs, and the broader social order, only exist 
through concerted efforts of individuals who constantly strive to reduce the inevitable 
waxing of conflict in our everyday lives.
At first glance, this perspective seems similar to more contemporary American prag-
matists such as Richard Rorty. In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, he argued that a 
liberal utopia would be one where people could freely engage with one another, arguing 
about right and wrong based on the specific contingencies of contemporary contexts, all 
in an effort to avoid cruelty. Like the French pragmatists, then, he illustrates the central-
ity of conflict and justification in social life, based on the incommensurability of self-
development and solidarity, and the contingency of the contemporary language/beliefs/
experiences in influencing how we argue, what we agree on, and how we define the 
communities we belong to. In his final chapter, he argued that we must focus more on 
constructing what we have in common, to expand our understanding of what “we” means 
as much as possible, in order to reduce the suffering, cruelty, and conflict associated with 
how we treat the Other. In a Meadian language, we must try to construct the GO as large 
as possible to understand one another and better unify our thoughts and actions, even if 
we recognize that there are deviations within this GO (Rorty, 1989: xiii–xvi, 44–69, 
189–198). However, French pragmatists make no requirement for unity. They agree that 
conflict is inevitable, but note that this need not be a problem. We should instead focus 
on how people periodically piece together unity within a social system that is always in 
flux; always up for negotiation and argumentation/justification.
This willingness to accept disagreement is one of the reasons why Quéré and Terzi 
believe that the French approach is not pragmatic in the American sense of the word. In 
their view, American pragmatism highlights “situations that are not characterized by the 
clash of meanings and interpretations. On the contrary, situation are integrative and uni-
fying. In fact, their dynamics are totalizing” (Quéré and Terzi, 2014: 99). Their focus on 
American pragmatists’ emphasis on action illustrates this point: if social situations were 
radically uncertain, action would be impossible as actors would never know what others 
will do (Quéré and Terzi, 2014: 110–111).
What we illustrate here is that it is precisely this emphasis on conflict, not unity, that 
helps French pragmatism move the broader pragmatic (and phenomenological) para-
digm forward. The previous overemphasis on unity obscured the ways that conflict and 
justification illustrate the agency that American pragmatism champions. Only during 
conflict and disputes can we clearly see individuals’ attempts to intentionally perceive an 
others’ state of mind. American pragmatists and phenomenological sociologists devel-
oped a powerful paradigm to understand how people intentionally act in concert when 
they understand the world in similar ways; French pragmatists extend this paradigm by 
providing a framework to understand how they consciously overcome moments of disa-
greement. Without this emphasis on conflict, pragmatists were not only missing a signifi-
cant portion of social life, but they have also neglected one of the best moments to 
highlight and illustrate people’s intentionality and agency in amending their understand-
ings of the social world.
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Conclusion
The central goal of this article was to facilitate further engagement between American 
and French pragmatic scholars. We did this by highlighting how French pragmatic soci-
ology is embedded in an intellectual tradition that privileges the study of actors in inde-
terminate social situations and takes the reflexivity and capacities of people’s common 
sense seriously. In this sense, it is part of the micro-sociological legacy of American 
pragmatism and phenomenology, which seek to identify the frames of common sense in 
order to comprehend how people make sense of their everyday life in rational and scien-
tific ways.
French pragmatic sociology focuses on how states of mind (intentional peculiar fash-
ions or GOs), underpinning basic frames, are instantiated in social life by a broader cul-
ture and political philosophies (Lamont and Thévenot, 2000) and are often in opposition 
to each other. Ultimately, this innovation in pragmatic theory highlights that there is 
neither a unified understanding of the social world, nor is conflict pathological; it is 
assumed to be the normal state of the world. It is possible to peacefully share a specific 
state of mind with other community members, but argumentative conflicts between indi-
viduals who operate in different polities/communities in a specific situation are also 
consubstantial to social life.
French pragmatism, thus, helps address the shortcomings of both American pragma-
tism and phenomenology. First, it creates a more realistic model for the relationship 
between interactions and institutions. Keeping institutions’ reliance on interactions a 
foundation, French pragmatists better incorporate the inheritance of understandings 
from culture than a classical Meadian approach. What is considered as instituted can be 
re-instituted or changed by disputes/argumentations in the life-world. Second, actors 
are no longer assumed to live with is an agreed-upon collective understanding of the 
world in peace. Different perspectives, different GOs, are the norm. This school of 
thought offers a way to measure and observe how actors work to align their general 
understandings of others’ perspectives through justification and debate. This normaliza-
tion of conflict, dispute, and disagreement has important implications for the study of 
power. French pragmatism’s acceptance of non-peaceful outcomes resonates with 
Athens’ (2007) radical interactionism. In this paradigm, people have more power than 
others, both within and between collective understandings, and they are able to exercise 
this power against those with whom they disagree, effectively excluding them from an 
accepted concord with a GO and its associated community. The French inherited the 
legacy of American pragmatism and phenomenology and made them better able to real-
istically describe the social world.
French pragmatic sociology illustrates that social life is possible because we can rec-
ognize that the self and other are able to share the same representation of the world, the 
same “state of mind” akin to Mead’s GO. But French pragmatic sociology pluralizes the 
GO. Human beings do not live in a peaceful social world where communication always 
allows them to find a common point of view. Our culture includes states of mind which 
are often in conflict. French pragmatic sociology makes Mead’s democratic theory more 
realistic, less utopian. Democracy is conflict, opposition in itself. We do not have to 
dream about a better state: it is the better one – a space to argue and to oppose each other. 
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We do not need to develop the communicative system so completely that we fully under-
stand and meld our thoughts with the Other. Conflict does not need to be resolved to 
allow the self to be reintegrated in the community: community is plural and rests on 
states of mind which can be shared, or not.
French pragmatic sociology allows us to understand a society in which there are dif-
ferent GOs, believing in different common goods, collective and cultural dispositions 
that can be oppositional. The intentional state of mind, the polity, or the GO that people 
mobilize to understand a situation won’t necessarily find the best communicative way to 
convince the community who prioritizes a different common good. Each dispute can 
temporarily be closed, but the common goods that were so many categories to justify one 
position in it remain available for new conflicts and argumentations. In this way, ordi-
nary people rationalize their world and their argumentations as the scientist rationalizes 
his own. The classical epistemological break held by sociologists from Durkheim (2008 
[1912]) to Bourdieu (Bourdieu et al., 1991: 13–32) is closed, and post-positivist sociol-
ogy finds a consistent alternative: the pragmatic sociological framework, starting with 
classical American approaches and, when integrated with phenomenological sociology, 
continued by Francophone scholars.
Note
1. Max Scheler is the first author who sought to explicitly integrate phenomenology and sociol-
ogy, although Schütz is repeatedly, but mistakenly, credited for having done so (Wolff, 1978).
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